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Abstract This paper investigates the relationship be-
tween public subsidies and firm innovation in transition
and developing economies, which are likely to have less
developed financial markets. Innovation includes the
introduction of new products or services and the upgrade
of existing ones, which is of particular relevance for these
economies. The results obtained using alternative mea-
sures of financial constraints and market competition,
within a range of econometric techniques, suggesting a
positive relation between public subsidies and the inno-
vative activities of 11,998 firms across 30 Eastern Europe
and Central Asian countries. This correlation is stronger
for firms more likely to be financially constrained.
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1 Introduction
Innovation is regarded as an important driving element of
firm-level productivity, competitiveness and growth.
Equally largely accepted is the view that innovative activ-
ities are difficult to finance due to imperfect capital mar-
kets. A large strand of literature highlights that firm
innovative activities are likely to bemore severely affected
by financial constraints than fixed capital investment due
to the higher complexity, specificity and degree of uncer-
tainty characterising innovation projects. Studies in this
literature stream have focused on the role played by inter-
nal finance (Himmelberg and Petersen 1994;Mulkay et al.
2001), cost and availability of external funding (Hall 2002;
Brown et al. 2012) and overall country financial develop-
ment (Hsu et al. 2014) for R&D investment.
As government intervention has become common
practice to support private innovative activities in most
industrialised countries, another strand of literature has
developed to investigate whether subsidies have addi-
tional effects or else they merely replace private funding
of given R&D investments.1 Hall and Lerner (2010)
find limited evidence to support the effectiveness of
US government programmes, but other studies based
on European countries data link public subsidies with
increased firm innovative activities.2
This paper is related to both strands of literature.
Using firm-level data, the analysis focuses on the role
of public subsidies for the innovative activities of firms
in emerging market economies, which has been the
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1 While government intervention takes mainly the form of direct
grants, several OECD countries offer R&D tax incentives as well.
Consequently, a separate strand of research has evaluated the impact
of tax credits on R&D. The literature review section mentions this
strand briefly as tax incentives are not present in most of our sampled
countries and data is not available.
2 See, for instance, evidence in Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) for East
Germany; Aerts and Schmidt (2008), Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento
(2013) for Germany and Flanders, Colombo et al. (2011) for Italy
and Takalo et al. (2013a) for Finland.
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object of less scrutiny so far. Furthermore, emphasis is
put on the interaction between public subsidies and firm
financial constraints. As capital markets in emerging
countries are less mature, firms’ investment in innova-
tive activities is likely to be more severely affected by
financial constraints relative to the innovative invest-
ment of firms in developed economies (Erol 2005;
Brown et al. 2011). Although mainly in the form of
imitation (i.e., new-to-firm innovation), innovation is
as important for the economic growth of these countries
as new-to-world innovations.3 Therefore, assessing
whether public subsidies effectively stimulate innova-
tion by alleviating firm financial constraints becomes
crucial. If so, public intervention targeting financial
sector development and innovation policy may help
hasten economic growth in emerging economies.
This paper uses a cross-country data set drawn from
the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey (BEEPS), which provides rich information on
innovation and finance for 11,998 enterprises in 30
countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Firm
innovation is defined broadly to include the introduction
of new products or services and upgrading an existing
product line service, which is of great relevance for firms
in emerging countries. Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer
(2013) and Ayyagari et al. (2011) use similarly defined
firm innovation indicators and focus on the role of finan-
cial factors in such countries. These studies do not con-
sider, however, the role of subsidies for firm innovation.
With few exceptions (e.g. Hyytinen and Toivanen 2005;
Aerts and Schmidt 2008; Paunov 2012), the R&D subsi-
dy literature contrasts the innovative behaviour of
subsidised and unsubsidised firms without taking into
account their financial strength. This paper aims to find
whether subsidies facilitate innovation via ameliorating
firm financial constraints.
Detailed information in the BEEPS survey allows us
to construct several alternative indicators of firm financial
strength based on objective measures of internal financial
resources, access to and use of external funding as well as
responses regarding the difficulty of access to external
finance, which could be an obstacle to firm development
and operations. The analysis controls for various factors
affecting firm innovation, including indicators of product
market competition (Beneito et al. 2015). The empirical
results suggest a positive relationship between firm inno-
vation and receipt of public subsidies. Additional tests
delving deeper in the data indicate that the relationship is
stronger for financially constrained firms. Exploiting the
cross-country variation in the data, the analysis is con-
ducted also separately on samples according to country
EUmembership at the time the information was collected
in the 2009 BEEPS survey.4 Our empirical findings sug-
gest that subsidies have a stronger impact on alleviating
financial constraints for firms in non-EU countries, which
are likely to have less developed financial markets than
EU economies.5
The empirical results are robust to a range of tests.
Firstly, using alternative measures of firm financial
strength and a variety of controls leave the results un-
changed. Secondly, the results are robust to the choice of
estimator. Instrumental variables techniques, including
the newly developed special regressor estimator
(Lewbel 2000), deal with the potential endogeneity of
self-reported financial constraints. Finally, treatment ef-
fects and propensity score matching techniques address
the potential selection bias in that R&D-intensive firms
may be more likely to apply for a subsidy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 briefly reviews the two strands of the literature
this paper is related to. Section 3 outlines the empirical
strategy. Section 4 presents the data and gives some
summary statistics. Section 5 reports the empirical re-
sults and the final section concludes.
2 Literature review
This section reviews the two strands of the innovation
literature: one focusing on firm financial strength and the
3 Acemoglu et al. (2006) argue that innovation becomes more impor-
tant relative to imitation only when the country approaches the world
technology frontier.
4 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
the Slovak Republic and Slovenia became EU member countries in
2004. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. As some of the
survey questions refer to the previous 3 years, the latter two countries
may be included either in the EU or the non-EU group—this is
inconsequential for our findings. The non-EU countries include Alba-
nia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia; FYR Macedonia; Kosovo;
Montenegro; Serbia; 10 former Soviet Union countries (Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajiki-
stan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan); Mongolia; and Turkey.
5 Various sources provide different lists of countries classified as
emerging economies. All the countries in our dataset (except Mongo-
lia) were also sampled by Ayyagari et al. (2011). Following their
terminology, we refer to these countries as emerging economies. It is
important to note, however, that whether this term applies to a partic-
ular country may change over time.
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other investigating the role of public subsidies. Finally, it
mentions the few papers controlling for both firm finan-
cial strength and availability of public subsidies.
2.1 Financial constraints and innovation
The importance of binding financial constraints for firm
innovative activities has long been acknowledged in the
literature. In a seminal paper, Fazzari et al. (1988)
established that the sensitivity of firms’ investment to
cash flow fluctuations reveals the presence of financing
constraints for firms.6 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) chal-
lenged their approach on the grounds that investment-
cash flow sensitivities need not increase monotonically
with financial constraints and that investment opportu-
nities may not be sufficiently controlled for. The subse-
quent long debate has prompted the literature to consid-
er alternative proxies for firm wealth and different ways
of identifying how financing constraints may impact
firm activities such as growth, fixed capital investment,
inventory accumulation and R&D expenditure.
Several studies emphasising the role of internal fi-
nance for firm R&D investment, use panel data and
employ an instrumental variable approach to control
for the endogeneity of cash flow. Among others,
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) find a significant cash
flow effect in their panel of small US firms in high-tech
industries; Mulkay et al. (2001) compare the cash flow
sensitivity of R&D investment in a dynamic setting for
firms in USA versus France.
Recent studies have suggested ways to circumvent
the drawbacks related with the use of cash flow as a
measure of internal resources. Czarnitzki and Hottenrott
(2011a, b) propose using the empirical price-cost mar-
gin. Brown et al. (2012) advocate the use of cash hold-
ings, instead of cash flow, as it more accurately incor-
porates firm R&D smoothing behaviour in response to
high adjustment costs. Aghion et al. (2012) propose a
payment incident variable as an indicator of firm credit
constraints. They find that French firms’ R&D invest-
ment is negatively correlated with supplier overdue
payments and the effect is stronger in sectors more
dependent on external finance.
Kim and Weisbach (2008) suggest equity plays an
important role in raising capital for R&D spending.
Brown and Petersen (2009) and Brown et al. (2012)
estimate dynamic panel models and confirm the
linkage between stock issues and R&D investment of
US and European firms, respectively. Using panel data
for 32 countries, Hsu et al. (2014) show that overall
market capitalization encourages innovation productiv-
ity (as measured by patenting).
Debt finance may not be the preferred source
for financing innovation due to the high complex-
ity, specificity, degree of uncertainty and limited
collateral value characterising innovation projects.7
Hall (2002) reports that R&D-intensive firms nor-
mally exhibit lower debt ratios than firms engag-
ing less in R&D. Similarly, Brown et al. (2012)
find weak debt finance effects on the R&D invest-
ment of US quoted firms. On the contrary, using
cross-sectional survey data, Ayyagari et al. (2011)
find a positive relation between access to external
financing, most likely bank financing and the ex-
tent of firm innovation in emerging economies.
Firm-level survey data regarding cost and
availability of finance facilitates construction of
alternative direct measures of financial constraints.
For example, Canepa and Stoneman (2008) link (lack
of) availability of finance with the likelihood that firms
from high-tech industries and small firms in the UK
report a project being abandoned or delayed.
Hajivassiliou and Savignac (2016) study whether
French firms’ innovative projects were delayed, aban-
doned or non-started due to one of the following
reasons: unavailability of new financing, searching
and waiting for new financing or too high cost of
finance. Using responses to questions on how severe
an obstacle is access to and cost of external funding
for business operations, Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer
(2013) show that firms’ decisions to invest in innova-
tive activities are sensitive to financial frictions.
6 Basically, Fazzari et al. (1988) compare the results for the investment-
cash flow relationship for several (the q, the neoclassical, and the
accelerator) models of investment across firm categories according to
their earnings retention. They interpret the larger cash flow sensitivity
for firms that retain and invest most of their income relative to that for
firms paying high dividends as evidence that financial constraints affect
firm investment. Their tests are mainly based on linear estimation of
static panel investment models including cash flow and internal liquid-
ity. Their analysis, however, ignores controls for external financing
sources and gives little thought to the possibility of cash flow
endogeneity.
7 Another source for financing innovation activities (in developed
markets) is venture capital (Cochrane 2005). Brander et al. (2015)
investigate the role of government sponsored venture capital using
cross-country data.
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2.2 Subsidies and innovation
Government support of R&D is rooted in the idea of
market failures that lead to private underinvestment in
R&D. This can be due to private R&D investments not
being able to fully appropriate all benefits as other
companies may free ride and benefit from innovations.
R&D underinvestment may also occur due to imperfect
capital markets which hinder the financing of socially
desirable projects. Governments should then support
those projects that are socially beneficial and would
not be carried out in the absence of a subsidy. If public
funding merely replaces (crowds out) private funding,
no additional R&D investments are generated.
The impact of public subsidies on firm innovation
has attracted much interest in the literature. Overall, the
empirical literature concludes against public subsidies
completely crowding out private investment. Despite
finding crowding out effects, Wallsten (2000) cannot
rule out that the US SBIR grants allowed firms to
continue their R&D activities at a constant level rather
than cutting back. A series of papers use cross-sectional
survey data for European countries and conduct a treat-
ment effect analysis. Evidence that public support stim-
ulates private R&D investment is found for firms in East
Germany (Almus and Czarnitzki 2003), Finland
(Czarnitzki et al. 2007) and Flanders and Germany
(Aerts and Schmidt 2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento
2013, 2014; Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 2014).
Panel data studies generally find some crowding in
effects. For instance, Lach (2002) reports substantial
stimulation of the own R&D spending of small Israeli
firms. Girma et al. (2007) show that only grants
supporting productivity-enhancing activities increase to-
tal factor productivity of Irish plants. Similarly, Colombo
et al. (2011) analyse 247 new technology-based Italian
firms to find that only subsidies provided on a competi-
tive basis have large positive effects on firm TFP growth.
Distinguishing between research and development
grants, Hottenrott et al. (2014) find evidence of both
direct and cross-scheme effects and the magnitude of
the treatment effects depends on firm size and age.
Takalo et al. (2013a) model the subsidy application
and R&D investment decisions of the firm and also the
subsidy granting decision of the public agency in charge
of the program to estimate the expected welfare effects
of targeted R&D subsidies using project level data from
Finland. Allowing for both fixed and sunk costs affect-
ing firms’ R&D participation and continuation decision,
Arque-Castells and Mohnen (2015) show that subsidy
policies may have long lasting effects. Their dynamic
additionality prediction finds support in empirical re-
sults obtained on a panel of Spanish manufacturing
firms: subsidy policies may affect both the number of
R&D firms and intensity.
While the subsidy literature focuses on developed
economies, there is evidence pointing towards the im-
portance of state programs in Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia. Among others, Ginevičius et al. (2008) stress
that the intensity of the state aid (the share of project
value) and not the absolute amount significantly influ-
ences firm innovation in Lithuania. Aubakirova (2014)
shows that participation in state programs is considered
to be one of the real chances to strengthen financial
stability and growth of the innovation activity in Ka-
zakhstan. Using 2015 survey data from 263 Polish firms
in high-tech industries, Wach (2016) concludes that
policy makers should continue to support especially
highly innovative industries.
Governments may also offer loans or tax credits to
foster private sector R&D. Similar to subsidies, several
studies have scrutinised whether tax credits affect firm
R&D expenditure. Kobayashi (2014) finds that R&D
tax credits induce an increase in Japanese SMEs’ R&D
expenditures and the effect is larger for liquidity-
constrained firms. However, Cowling (2016) and
Busom et al. (2014, 2016) do not think that tax credits
significantly affect SME’s R&D in the UK and Spain,
respectively. Relative to subsidies, tax credits eliminate
potential government preferencewith respect to industry
and the type of the firm. In order to benefit from tax
incentives, firms have to first fund R&D projects that
comply with the government’s definition of R&D.
Therefore, firms facing financial constraints are less
likely to benefit from tax credits than from subsidies.
This is likely to be particularly relevant for firms in
countries with less-developed financial markets. Our
analysis does not consider R&D tax incentives due to
data unavailability and the absence of this policy instru-
ment in many of the Eastern Europe and Central Asia
countries in our sample.8
Czarnitztki et al. (2015) model the behaviour of firms
in four alternative scenarios: a subsidy regime, a tax
credit policy, no public support and a European-wide
agency deciding on subsidies. Using project-level data
8 Kapil et al. (2013) propose the introduction of tax incentives in
Poland additional to direct EU state aid.
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for Flanders, Germany and Finland, their study finds
larger welfare effects from an EU innovation policy due
to cross-country spillovers.
2.3 Subsidies, financial constraints and innovation
A handful of papers take into account capital market
imperfections when studying the effects of subsidies on
firm innovation. Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) show
that government funding disproportionately affected the
R&D expenditure of Finnish SME firms operating in
industries dependent on external finance, pointing out to
a crowding out effect. However, Aerts and Schmidt
(2008) control for firm financial strength (cash flow
for Flanders and a four-point Likert scale for Germany)
and reject the hypothesis that public R&D subsidies
crowd out private R&D investment in their samples.
Takalo et al. (2013b) model the interaction between
public and private financiers of firm R&D and show that
higher costs of external finance increase (decrease) the
optimal subsidy rate at the extensive (intensive) margin.
Finding evidence of subsidy additionality crucially de-
pends on the size of subsidy spillover effects.
Brzozowski and Cucculelli (2016) use cross-
sectional data on over 13,000 firms in seven European
countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Spain and UK) to analyse the impact of the financial
crisis on firm innovative behaviour. Their results sug-
gest that firms with prior access to credit, who have
benefited from public support to investment in 2007–
2009, are more likely to expand their product offer.
Paunov (2012) analyses firms’ innovation performance
during the financial crisis in eight Latin American coun-
tries. Controlling for access to external funding, Paunov
(2012) shows that manufacturing firms with access to
public funding were less likely to discontinue innova-
tion projects in 2008–2009.
3 Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy bridges the analysis in the
firm financial strength stream (e.g. Gorodnichenko
and Schnitzer 2013; Ayyagari et al. 2011), with the
approach in the R&D subsidy literature (e.g. Aerts
and Schmidt 2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento
2013), to account for the role of public subsidies
on firm innovative activities. The baseline empirical
model specifies firm innovative activities as a
function of subsidies received, firm financial
strength, firm R&D effort and other controls:
Innovatei ¼ Φ Subsidyi; FSi;R&Di;X ið Þ ð1Þ
where i indexes firms. The dependent variable Innovatei
is a generic dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the firm
reports an innovative activity, 0 otherwise. Subsidyi in-
dicates receipt of a subsidy, FSi measures firm financial
strength and R&Di records whether the firm invested in
R&D. The control Xi consist of various factors thought to
affect firm innovative activities, such as firm size and
age, foreign capital, export status and industry and coun-
try characteristics. Detailed description of all the vari-
ables is provided in the data section below.
Benefiting from rich firm financial information, this
study uses accounting data-based indicators for access
to external funding (like Ayyagari et al. 2011; Paunov
2012) and for availability of internal finance (as in
Brown et al. 2012)), as well as direct measures of
financial constraints reported by firms (similar to
Aghion et al. 2012; Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer
2013). The use of alternative measures facilitates com-
parison with the extant literature, exploits the advan-
tages brought by each approach and helps reduce con-
cerns about the appropriateness of the financial con-
straints indicators used in this study.
The multivariate analysis starts with the estimation of
simple probit models. An instrumental variable ap-
proach (both probit and a special regressor) deals with
potential concerns regarding endogeneity of financial
variables. A matching estimator addresses the potential
sample selection bias in receiving subsidies, as routinely
done by the subsidies strand of the innovation literature.
Even though it does not establish a causal relationship,
through the variety of controls and estimation tech-
niques, this study assesses the links between innovation,
public subsidies, firm financial health and input in
innovation.
4 Data and summary statistics
4.1 Sample
The data used in this study is drawn from the Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS), a joint initiative of the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the
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World Bank. BEEPS is a particularly rich data set cov-
ering a broad range of business environment topics
including innovation, access to finance, trade, competi-
tion and performance measures. The cross-sectional
analysis in this study uses the fourth round of the survey,
2009 BEEPS.9 Starting with 2008, the survey
underwent changes in the questionnaire and methodol-
ogy which aimed to improve cross-country comparabil-
ity and to make it compatible with the Enterprise Sur-
veys the World Bank has been implementing in other
regions of the world since 2006. Earlier rounds of
BEEPS have been used by Brown et al. (2011),
Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013), Popov (2013),
Hanedar et al. (2014), while Ayyagari et al. (2011) use
the 2006 World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
Since 2008, the survey universe consist of the major-
ity of manufacturing sectors (excluding extraction), retail
trade, construction and most services sectors (wholesale,
hotels, restaurants, transport, storage, communications,
IT).10 Only registered companies with at least five em-
ployees are eligible for interview but there are no restric-
tions on firm age. Firms with 100% government/state
ownership are no longer eligible to participate. In contrast
to previous rounds of BEEPS, there are no additional
requirements on the ownership, exporter status, location
or years in operation of the establishment. Starting with
the fourth round, BEEPS uses three instruments: the
manufacturing, the retail and the core (residual sectors)
questionnaire. Although many questions overlap, some
are asked only to one type of business (e.g. retail firms are
not asked questions about capacity utilisation).
BEEPS strive to provide a representative sample of a
country’s private sector in terms of economic sectors,
firm size and region distribution. The 2009 BEEPS
covered 11,998 firms in 30 countries of Eastern Europe
and Central Asia. Appendix Table 12 provides the struc-
ture of the sample by country (panel A) and by main
industry groups (panel B).
A. Innovative activities The generic outcome variable
Innovate denotes, alternatively, several variables
derived from questions regarding firm innovative
activities. NewProduct is a binary variable equal to
1 if the firm answered Byes^ (0 if it answered Bno^)
to the following question: BIn the last three years,
has this establishment introduced new products or
services?^. Upgrade is constructed similarly if the
firm upgraded an existing product line or service in
the previous three years. The BEEPS questions align
closely with the definition in the Oslo Manual
(OECD 2005) developed by OECD and Eurostat
for innovation surveys. Gorodnichenko and
Schnitzer (2013) analyse similarly defined variables
using earlier rounds of BEEPS. In their UK SMEs
analysis, Lee et al. (2015) also define innovators as
those firms which have introduced a new product in
the previous 12 months.
Even though 2009 BEEPS does not include infor-
mation regarding the introduction of new technolo-
gies, NewProduct and Upgrade provide a good
reflection of firm innovation in the BEEPS sample
since these are the most common innovative
activities undertaken by firms in emerging
economies. Ayyagari et al. (2011) identify eight firm
innovative activities using responses to similar ques-
tions in the Enterprise Surveys of the World Bank
and observe that a higher percentage of firms are
more actively engaged in core innovation (introduced
a new product line, upgraded existing product lines)
than in other innovative activities.
Additionally, BEEPS 2009 asks businesses whether
they have contracted with other companies (outsourced)
activities previously performed in-house or have
discontinued at least one product or service in the last
3 years. Responses to these questions are coded 1–0
(yes-no) to create two more variables, Outsource and
Discont. Only manufacturing firms are asked the ques-
tion on outsourcing. On the contrary, all firms are asked
whether they discontinued at least one product line or
service in the last 3 years. One could argue though that
this is not a measure of innovation but rather a measure
of firm flexibility and dynamism (Ayyagari et al. 2011).
Notwithstanding their weaknesses, these two variables
are used to complement the firm innovation analysis in
additional tests.
Besides information about the outcome of innovative
activities, the survey provides data on whether firms had
any (in-house or outsourced) R&D expenditure in 2007.
Even though R&D expenditure does not necessarily
lead to innovation, it provides a good measure of firm
9 The survey was first undertaken in 1999–2000, and was followed by
subsequent rounds in 2002, 2004–2005 and 2008–2009. Data for the
fifth round, 2012–2013, became available in January 2015.
10 This corresponds to firms classified with ISIC Rev 3.1 codes 15–37,
45, 50–52, 55, 60–64 and 72. Prior to 2008, the survey universe
consisted of industry and most service sectors. This corresponded to
firms classified with ISIC Rev 3.1 codes 10–14, 15–37, 45, 50–52, 55,
60–64, 70–74, 92.1–92.4 and 93.
S. Mateut
innovation input.11 The variable R&D, equal to 1 if the
firm spent a positive amount on R&D expenditure, 0
otherwise, captures firm effort in innovative activities.
The use of the R&D indicator is preferred since 64% of
firms who report having spent money on research and
development activities, either in-house or outsourced,
do not disclose these amounts. A continuous variable
defined as the natural logarithm of R&D expenditure is
used in the sensitivity analysis, but these results should
be handled with care.
B. Subsidies The next crucial survey data used is infor-
mation on whether the firm has received any subsidies
in the last 3 years. The BEEPS question mentions
several possible sources of subsidies, namely from the
national, regional or local governments and European
Union sources. It does not distinguish among them,
however, and does not report amounts of subsidies. No
details are provided about the purpose of the subsidies.
This is why the analysis can only investigate whether
receipt (or not) of subsidies is linked with firm innova-
tion while controlling for R&D effort. Subsidy takes a
value of 1 if the firm has received any subsidies from
any source and 0 if otherwise.
C. Financial strength BEEPS 2009 collects a host of
information regarding firms’ current and past financial
situation. For instance, using survey responses, two
variables gauge firms’ current access to external finance.
CreditLine takes a value of 1 if the firm had a line of
credit or a loan from a financial institution and 0 if
otherwise. Similarly, Overdraft is coded 1/0 if the firm
had an overdraft facility at the time of the interview.
Firms are also asked to estimate the proportion of funds
from various sources used to finance purchases of fixed
assets over fiscal year 2007. BankLoan is coded 1/0 if
the firm borrowed from private or state-owned banks to
fund purchases of fixed assets. Firms which did not
purchase any fixed assets in 2007 were not asked this
question. Ayyagari et al. (2011) use a similarly defined
variable to show that access to bank financing is posi-
tively associated with the extent of innovation undertak-
en by firms in emerging economies.
Internal finance availability at the time of the interview
is gauged by CashHolding, defined 1/0 if firms report
having a checking or savings account. This variable is
similar to the cash holdingsmeasure advocated by Brown
et al. (2012) and avoids the drawbacks associatedwith the
use of cash flow mentioned in Section 2.1.12
Overdue is defined 1/0 if the firm has overdue pay-
ments by more than 90 days. It is similar in nature to the
overdue payments to suppliers indicator proposed by
Aghion et al. (2012) as a measure of firm financial
constraints. While earlier rounds allowed separation of
overdue payments into four categories (utilities, taxes,
employees and material input suppliers), the fourth
round of BEEPS used here reports information only
about overdue payments to utilities or taxes.
Besides measures of actual use of (external and in-
ternal) finance, BEEPS reports respondents’ opinions
on what are their major obstacles to firm growth and
performance. FC is set equal to 1 if firms choose access
to finance as their current biggest obstacle and equal to 0
if they choose any of the other 14 possible answers
(details in the data appendix). This provides a direct
measure of self-reported financial constraints.
D. Controls The analysis includes several control vari-
ables likely to impact on whether a firm undertakes
innovative activities. Consistent with the literature, the
logarithm of the number of employees (EMP) and its
squared term (EMP2) allow for a potential non-linear
size effect. Age, calculated as the logarithm of the
number of years since the company was formally regis-
tered, controls for two possible effects. On the one hand,
older firms may have accumulated knowledge and may
therefore be more likely to innovate. On the other hand,
older firms may have developed routines and may be
more rigid and less likely to engage in innovative
activities.
11 Other papers, e.g. Aerts and Schmidt (2008) and Czarnitzki and
Lopes-Bento (2013), use information on the firms’ patent stock in-
stead. We cannot follow this approach due to the anonymity of firms in
the BEEPS sample which makes it impossible to match in patent data.
Moreover, while patent data is accurately measured, it has its draw-
backs: it measures inventions rather than innovations; firms often use
measures other than patents to protect their innovations; the tendency
to patent varies across countries and industries. The analysis will
control for industry and country specific patterns by including industry
and country fixed effects.
12 Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011a) suggest using the empirical price-
cost margin = (sales − labour andmaterial costs + δR&D expenditure)/
sales, where the labour and material cost shares (δ = 0.93) of the R&D
expenditure are added back in order to measure internally available
funds during the year irrespective of the actual decision on R&D
investment. We do not use this indicator due to data restrictions: the
large proportion of missing data for R&D expenditure (mentioned
above) and the availability of material costs only for manufacturing
firms reduces the number of observations for this variable to roughly a
quarter of sample size.
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The survey includes several questions about market
characteristics and the degree of competition in the
market. It is generally accepted that foreign competition
and exporting status impact firm behaviour. According-
ly, all regressions control for whether the firm engages
in export markets (Export) and whether it has majority
foreign capital (Foreign). Some models take into ac-
count whether the respondents are part of a larger firm
(Group).
Firms are asked directly how important domestic com-
petitors, foreign competitors and customers, were in af-
fecting their decisions to develop new products or services
and markets. Using the four-ordered responses, three mea-
sures (Pres_dcomp, Pres_fcomp, Pres_cust) are coded 1 if
the firm answers ‘fairly important’ or ‘very important’ and
0 if the firm answers ‘not at all important’ or ‘slightly
important’, regarding the pressure exerted by domestic
competitors, foreign competitors and customers, respec-
tively.13 Furthermore, City is an ordinal variable taking
five values corresponding to the population size of the city
where the firm is located (1 = capital city and 5 = town
with population less than 50,000).
Additional detailed information is available in the
manufacturing firms’ questionnaire. For instance, with
reference to year 2007, the survey provides information
about the number of competitors (Compet) grouped into
four categories: 1 (no competitors), 2 (1 competitor), 3
(2–5 competitors) and 4 (more than 5 competitors).
Market takes a value of 1 if the firm’s main product
market is local, 2 if it is national and 3 if the firm mainly
sells on the international market. There is data on firm
capacity utilisation (CU), capital intensity (CapIntens),
defined as the net book value of machinery, vehicles and
equipment relative to permanent full-time employees in
2007 and whether the firm imported material inputs or
supplies (Importinp). A firm’s ability to innovate de-
pends to a large extent on the knowledge base of its
employees, which can be measured by formal training
provided to its full-time employees (Training).
Industry dummies control for unobserved heteroge-
neity across industries that may not be captured by other
observables. Industry characteristics are important as
they are likely to affect firm innovativeness, firm finan-
cial strength and reliance on external funding, as well as
the likelihood of receiving subsidies. Industries are also
important in determining the relevant market in which
firms operate.14 Industry groups are based on the actual
establishment’s (four digits) industry classification. Fi-
nally, country dummies capture other country-specific
fixed effects.15 Appendix Table 12 describes the country
and industry composition of our data.
4.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 summarises, by country, the proportions of firms
that undertook different innovative activities over the
3 years prior to the survey (panel A). Across countries,
the most common innovative activity is upgrading an
existing product, followed by the introduction of a new
product or service. On average, the proportion of firms
that upgraded an existing product or service (73.3%) is
roughly three times larger than the percentage of firms
that outsourced an activity (25.8%) or discontinued an
existing product or service (24.3%). Slightly more than
half the firms introduced a new product (54.1%) in the
last 3 years. These raw descriptive statistics support the
use of NewProduct and Upgrade as themain indicators of
firm innovative activities in this study and are consistent
with the numbers calculated by Ayyagari et al. (2011)
using the 2006 World Bank Enterprise Survey.
Looking at the proportions across countries, Lithua-
nian and Slovenian firms seem to be the most innovative.
In Lithuania, 91.2% of firms have upgraded a product or
service and 69.8% of firms introduced a new product or
service in recent years, which compares well with the
proportions for Slovenia (90.8% upgraded and 74.5%
introduced new products). At the other extreme, Uzbek
firms are the least innovative across all categories (23%
upgraded and 37.4% introduced new products). At the
same time, Uzbekistan stands out as the country with the
lowest proportion of firms (2.5%) that spent a positive
amount on R&D activities in 2007, which is ten times
lower than the sample average (24.6%).
Panel B of Table 1 presents additional statistics
(mean, standard deviation and number of observations)
where responses are grouped according to country EU
13 Using the 2003Mannheim Innovation Survey, Cappelli et al. (2014)
find that pressure from competitors matter for imitation, while cus-
tomers and research institutions deliver valuable knowledge for sales
with market novelties, and there are no significant spillover effects
from suppliers.
14 Beneito et al. (2015) construct several measures of product substi-
tutability, market size and entry costs in their empirical analysis on the
relationship between market competitive pressure and firm innovation.
15 The country-specific effects include institutional factors such as
intellectual property rights, corruption and cultural and property
rights. See Krasniqi and Desai (2016) for a detailed country-level
analysis of institutional drivers of high-growth firms.
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Table 1 Indicators of firm innovative activity
Panel A. Indicators of firm innovative activity by country
Country NewProduct Upgrade Outsource Discont R&D Subsidy
Albania 0.414 0.701 0.115 0.109 0.305 0.018
Armenia 0.614 0.753 0.354 0.288 0.219 0.008
Azerbaijan 0.442 0.742 0.261 0.226 0.082 0.037
Belarus 0.696 0.907 0.2 0.342 0.198 0.041
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.599 0.81 0.213 0.196 0.468 0.144
Bulgaria 0.423 0.586 0.196 0.147 0.285 0.038
Croatia 0.658 0.761 0.338 0.312 0.519 0.266
Czech Republic 0.622 0.72 0.356 0.301 0.282 0.24
Estonia 0.641 0.78 0.478 0.429 0.359 0.187
FYR Macedonia 0.597 0.766 0.243 0.164 0.413 0.038
Georgia 0.349 0.749 0.182 0.152 0.134 0.041
Hungary 0.426 0.745 0.225 0.259 0.175 0.196
Kazakhstan 0.453 0.753 0.181 0.156 0.117 0.035
Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 0.549 0.869 0.052 0.382 0.264 0.041
Kyrgyz Republic 0.462 0.685 0.174 0.193 0.149 0.077
Latvia 0.605 0.893 0.281 0.387 0.181 0.141
Lithuania 0.698 0.912 0.464 0.447 0.239 0.17
Moldova 0.533 0.66 0.151 0.275 0.274 0.07
Mongolia 0.68 0.845 0.22 0.246 0.227 0.088
Montenegro 0.534 0.609 0.294 0.113 0.246 0.027
Poland 0.581 0.601 0.311 0.161 0.211 0.135
Romania 0.464 0.522 0.128 0.218 0.258 0.111
Russia 0.644 0.861 0.288 0.3 0.328 0.068
Serbia 0.621 0.751 0.389 0.245 0.331 0.075
Slovak Republic 0.526 0.703 0.259 0.242 0.151 0.165
Slovenia 0.745 0.908 0.392 0.324 0.411 0.252
Tajikistan 0.517 0.793 0.207 0.162 0.12 0.05
Turkey 0.448 0.598 0.269 0.217 0.273 0.09
Ukraine 0.568 0.77 0.234 0.245 0.198 0.024
Uzbekistan 0.230 0.374 0.217 0.133 0.025 0.025
Total 0.541 0.733 0.258 0.243 0.246 0.087
Panel B. Indicators of firm innovative activity by EU country membership
NewProduct Upgrade Outsource Discont R&D Subsidy
Non-EU Mean 0.526 0.725 0.241 0.228 0.246 0.063
SD 0.499 0.447 0.427 0.419 0.431 0.242
No firms 9510 9453 4128 9431 9458 9407
EU Mean 0.602 0.765 0.343 0.303 0.247 0.180
SD 0.490 0.424 0.475 0.460 0.431 0.384
No firms 2420 2403 819 2415 2413 2413
t test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.939 0.000
Total Mean 0.541 0.733 0.258 0.243 0.246 0.087
SD 0.498 0.442 0.437 0.429 0.431 0.281
No firms 11,930 11,856 4947 11,846 11,871 11,820
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membership in 2004. The Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Repub-
lic and Slovenia are considered EU member countries.
The non-EU countries include Albania, Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cro-
atia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo,
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Romania, Russia,
Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.16
There are statistically significant differences in firm
innovativeness across the two country groups. Not sur-
prisingly and consistent with the idea that firms in less-
developed economies engage mainly in imitation, firms
in non-EU countries are more likely to upgrade an
existing product/service, while the average proportion
of firms that introduce a new product/service is higher in
EU countries. Nevertheless, the standard deviations for
the innovation indicators are large and conceal the fact
that firms in some non-EU countries (e.g. Russia and
Armenia) are more innovative than firms within some
EU countries (e.g. Hungary). The striking difference
across the two country groups regards, however, the
proportion of firms that report receipt of public subsi-
dies: 16.2% for firms in EU countries relative to 5.7% in
non-EU countries, with Croatia (26.6%) and Armenia
(0.8%) at the two extremes.
Finally, panel C shows that on average, firms receiv-
ing subsidies are more innovative than firms which do
not receive any subsidies. The differences are
statistically significant for all indicators of firm innova-
tion including engagement in R&D.
Table 2 reports the sample statistics of the variables
measuring firm financial strength (panel A). Slightly
less than half of the surveyed firms had access to a credit
line or loan from a financial institution (47.8%) or to an
overdraft facility (45.1%) at the time of the interview.
Bank loans were the funding source for about 40% of
the firms that purchased fixed assets in 2007. The vast
majority of firms have a checking or savings account.17
About 7% of firms experience payments overdue by
more than 90 days with utilities or taxes. Finally, the
self-reported measure of financial constraints suggests
that 17% of firms rank access to finance as the major
obstacle to their establishment’s operation. Panel B sug-
gests that on average, firms in EU countries are finan-
cially stronger than firms in non-EU countries. These
differences are statistically significant, with the excep-
tion of payments overdue for more than 90 days.
Panel C provides some descriptive statistics for the
other controls. While there is large variation in terms of
the number of employees (ranging from 1 to 100,000),
the vast majority (64.8%) of the sample firms are clas-
sified as small (less than 50 employees) and 90.7% of
firms are SMEs (less than 250 employees). About a
quarter of firms export their goods directly or indirectly,
and roughly 7% of firms have majority foreign capital.
The average firm age is 16 years but the large standard
deviation suggests the sample contains a mixture of very
young and old firms. The other controls are self-reported
measures of degree of competition in the product market
and, for manufacturing firms only, different measures of
Table 1 (continued)
Panel C. Indicators of firm innovative activity by subsidy receipt
NewProduct Upgrade Outsource Discont R&D
No subsidy Mean 0.527 0.724 0.238 0.236 0.228
SD 0.499 0.447 0.426 0.425 0.420
No firms 10,746 10,692 4322 10,678 10,716
Subsidy Mean 0.693 0.832 0.404 0.322 0.430
SD 0.461 0.374 0.491 0.468 0.495
No firms 1024 1014 565 1015 1015
t test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel A reports mean values.
Panel B: The EU countries are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The Non-EU
countries include Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Kazakh-
stan, Kosovo, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
16 EU membership is defined using 2004 as cutoff. Bulgaria and
Romania joined the EU on 1 January 2007. For respondents in these
two countries, questions referring to the previous 3 years would include
pre-EU periods. Croatia became an EUmember on 1 July 2013. These
three countries are considered non-EU members. However, as they
must have had sufficiently developed financial markets and institutions
in order to be allowed entry later on, they are included in the EU group
in robustness tests.
17 BEEPS reports missing values for the Slovak Republic since the
translation of the question inaccurately only asked about a savings
account, which made the data not being comparable across countries.
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capital utilisation and productivity. These statistics sug-
gest that domestic agents, customers and competitors
alike, put pressure on firms to innovate, while foreign
competitors play a much lesser role. On average, firms
operate close to three quarters of their full capacity.
Nearly 40% of firms provided training to their full-
time permanent employees in 2007.
Table 3 presents simple correlation coefficients. The
positive correlations between the alternative measures
of firm innovation are statistically significant at the 5%
level and the strongest relationship is between the two
main dependent variables NewProduct and Upgrade
(panel A). Better firm financial strength and receipt of
subsidies are associated with increased innovation (pan-
el B). The coefficients in panel C suggest that larger and
older firms are more innovative. Similarly, innovative
firms are likely to export, have foreign capital, belong to
a group and provide training to their employees. Finally,
according to panel D, more intense competition is asso-
ciated with increased firm innovation.
Table 2 Summary statistics
Panel A. Financial strength variables
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
CreditLine 11,853 0.478 0.500 0 1
Overdraft 11,116 0.451 0.498 0 1
BankLoan 6819 0.397 0.489 0 1
CashHolding 10,614 0.906 0.292 0 1
Overdue 11,916 0.072 0.258 0 1
FC 10,745 0.172 0.377 0 1
Panel B. Financial strength variables
CreditLine Overdraft BankLoan CashHolding Overdue FC
Non-EU Mean 0.458 0.443 0.384 0.890 0.072 0.184
SD 0.498 0.497 0.486 0.313 0.258 0.387
N 9456 8745 5203 9459 9496 8620
EU Mean 0.559 0.480 0.439 0.977 0.073 0.123
SD 0.497 0.500 0.496 0.151 0.260 0.328
N 2397 2371 1616 2155 2420 2125
t test (p value) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.781 0.000
Panel C. Controls
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
EMP 11,880 126.850 1076.128 1 100,000
Small 11,880 0.648 0.478 0 1
SME 11,880 0.907 0.291 0 1
Age 11,750 16.603 15.797 1 184
Exporter 11,998 0.264 0.441 0 1
Foreign 11,861 0.069 0.253 0 1
Group 11,998 0.107 0.309 0 1
City 11,998 3.08 1.553 1 5
Pres_domcomp 11,831 0.623 0.485 0 1
Pres_fcomp 11,594 0.365 0.482 0 1
Pres_customer 11,724 0.608 0.488 0 1
Compet 3892 3.380 0.883 1 4
Market 4991 1.838 0.702 1 3
CU 4634 0.735 0.236 0 1
Importinp 4738 0.326 0.369 0 1
Training 4937 0.395 0.489 0 1
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5 Empirical results
5.1 Baseline results
The empirical analysis begins by estimating the probabil-
ity that firm i undertakes an innovative activity. Table 4
reports marginal effects calculated at mean values and
robust standard errors clustered at the country level. The
baseline model includes non-linear firm size effects and
controls for export participation, foreign capital, R&D
effort and industry- and country-fixed effects. The results
suggest that there is a non-linear relationship between firm
size and the likelihood that the firm innovates (introduces
new products and services as well as upgrades an existing
product or service). Both export participation and presence
of foreign capital exert large and significant effects on firm
innovative activities. Firm age and being part of a larger
firm (Group, a standard control in the R&D subsidy
literature) do not appear to significantly affect firm inno-
vative activities in this sample.
Themarginal effects suggest that a major determinant
of firm innovative activities over the period 2007–2009
Table 3 Pairwise correlations
Panel A. Correlations among innovation measures
NewProduct Upgrade Outsource Discont
Upgrade 0.434*
Outsource 0.158* 0.143*
Discont 0.246* 0.171* 0.158*
R&D 0.303* 0.230* 0.203* 0.125*
Panel B. Correlations between innovation measures, subsidy and firm financial strength
NewProduct Upgrade Subsidy CreditLine Overdraft BankLoan
Subsidy 0.094* 0.069*
CreditLine 0.141* 0.087* 0.135*
Overdraft 0.103* 0.075* 0.082* 0.313*
BankLoan 0.057* 0.046* 0.097* 0.480* 0.181*
CashHolding 0.067* 0.078* 0.015 0.077* 0.127* 0.043*
Panel C. Correlations between innovation measures and firm characteristics
NewProduct Upgrade EMP SME Age Exporter Foreign Group CU
EMP 0.031* 0.016
SME −0.072* −0.058* −0.230*
Age 0.034* 0.016 0.081* −0.242*
Exporter 0.143* 0.082* 0.062* −0.186* 0.147*
Foreign 0.069* 0.043* 0.038* −0.129* −0.012 0.147*
Group 0.059* 0.032* 0.036* −0.101* 0.046* 0.055* 0.202*
CU −0.004 0.065* 0.046* −0.057* −0.078* 0.046* 0.055* 0.032*
Training 0.243* 0.181* 0.118* −0.176* 0.089* 0.202* 0.085* 0.109* 0.008
Panel D. Correlations between innovation measures and market competition
New Product Upgrade City Pres_domcomp Pres_fcomp Pres_customer Market Compet
City −0.033* −0.032*
Pres_domcomp 0.056* 0.043* 0.012
Pres_fcomp 0.083* 0.064* −0.028* 0.226*
Pres_customer 0.089* 0.034* −0.012 0.371* 0.261*
Market 0.083* 0.042* −0.038* 0.258* 0.086* 0.162*
Compet 0.044* 0.043* 0.051* −0.123* 0.237* 0.026 0.097*
Importinp 0.132* 0.131* −0.079* −0.065* 0.152* 0.002 0.040* 0.224*
The table reports pairwise correlation coefficients
*Indicates significance at 5% confidence level
S. Mateut
is firms’ engagement in R&D activities in 2007. For
sensitivity purposes, Table 13 in the Appendix replaces
the R&D indicator variable with a continuous measure,
the natural logarithm of (1+ R&D expenditure). While
the estimates are qualitatively similar irrespective of the
R&D measure used, the R&D dummy variable is pre-
ferred. The reason is that among the 2920 firms indicat-
ing they have engaged in R&D activities, only 1047
report non-negative R&D expenditure amounts while
the other 1873 firms do not disclose these amounts.
These are coded as missing values for the continuous
R&D variable. This explains the lower number of ob-
servations in Table 13 relative to Table 4.
Importantly, the estimates suggest a positive and
significant relationship between subsidies and firm in-
novative activities. Subsidies are more strongly corre-
lated with the likelihood of introducing new products or
services (columns 1–4) than with the likelihood of
upgrading an existing product or service (columns 5–
8). This finding continues to hold when the estimation
controls for firm financial strength (captured by
CreditLine) and is not sensitive to the measure of
R&D effort used.
Financial strength variables All Table 4 specifications
capture firm financial strength by CreditLine, an indica-
tor that the respondent has a line of credit or a loan from
a financial institution. Table 5 uses alternative measures
for firm financial strength. Access to external funding is
measured by availability of an overdraft facility (col-
umns 2 and 6) or by the use of bank loans to purchase
fixed assets (columns 3 and 7). Internal finance strength
is proxied by the existence of a checking or savings
account (columns 4 and 8). All these estimates suggest
that financial strength relates positively with firm inno-
vation. Irrespective of the measure used, firm financial
Table 4 Baseline results
NewProduct Upgrade
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EMP 0.048*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.074*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
EMP2 −0.004** −0.003* −0.003* −0.003* −0.008*** −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exporter 0.086*** 0.079*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.038*** 0.034** 0.037** 0.037**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Foreign 0.077*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.074*** 0.038** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.043***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
R&D 0.327*** 0.322*** 0.322*** 0.322*** 0.215*** 0.212*** 0.213*** 0.213***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Subsidy 0.076*** 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.054** 0.050** 0.051** 0.051**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
CreditLine 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age −0.004 −0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Group 0.026 −0.000
(0.019) (0.021)
Observations 11,341 11,267 11,092 11,092 11,271 11,198 11,024 11,024
Pseudo Rsq 0.125 0.128 0.129 0.129 0.124 0.125 0.126 0.126
Log likelihood −6844 −6777 −6665 −6664 −5715 −5663 −5562 −5562
The table reports marginal effects calculated at the mean. All specifications include country and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at country level in parentheses
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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strength is more strongly correlated with the likelihood
of introducing new products/services thanwith the prob-
ability of upgrading existing ones. This finding is con-
sistent with the higher degree of risk and lower collateral
value of activities related to introducing new products
relative to upgrading existing ones. Importantly,
subsidised firms are always more likely to innovate
regardless of the firm financial strength measure used.
The marginal effects are roughly twice larger for
NewProducts than for Upgrade.
Market characteristics The analysis focuses next on the
relationship between firm innovativeness and market
characteristics. One can argue that the intensity of
competition in the product market is the device that
gives firms an incentive to innovate. Besides exporting
status and foreign capital, the empirical analysis con-
siders now other measures of product market competi-
tion including the number of competitors (Compet), the
population size of the city where the firm is located
(City = 1/5 with 1 for capital, 5 for towns with less than
50,000 people), whether the firm uses imported inputs
(Importinp), the main product market in the previous
year (Market) and the importance of various factors
affecting firms’ decisions to develop new products and
services.
Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that competi-
tion is positively associated with increased innovation.
Table 5 Firm financial strength measures
NewProduct Upgrade
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EMP 0.039*** 0.044*** −0.008 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.067*** 0.021 0.075***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
EMP2 −0.003* −0.004** 0.002 −0.004** −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.002 −0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exporter 0.082*** 0.091*** 0.073*** 0.086*** 0.037** 0.038** 0.027** 0.040***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014)
Foreign 0.322*** 0.326*** 0.261*** 0.213*** 0.214*** 0.163***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
R&D 0.073*** 0.087*** 0.052*** 0.080*** 0.051** 0.065*** 0.036** 0.053**
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.023)
Subsidy 0.079*** 0.072*** 0.057*** 0.323*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.013 0.213***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011)
Age −0.004 −0.000 0.002 0.069*** 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.041**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.023) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016)
CreditLine 0.077*** −0.008 0.034*** −0.000
(0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Overdraft 0.052*** 0.042***
(0.013) (0.013)
BankLoan 0.029** 0.012
(0.014) (0.009)
CashHolding 0.072*** 0.042**
(0.024) (0.018)
Observations 11,092 10,404 6393 10,874 11,024 10,338 6369 10,805
Pseudo Rsq 0.129 0.131 0.117 0.127 0.126 0.129 0.127 0.126
Log likelihood −6665 −6234 −3680 −6546 −5562 −5238 −2671 −5454
The table reports marginal effects calculated at the mean. All specifications include industry and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at country level in parentheses
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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For instance, firms located in larger cities are more
likely to upgrade existing products but the association
between city size and the likelihood of introducing new
products is weaker. The estimates suggest that firms
innovate due to pressure from domestic competitors
and customers, while pressure from foreign competitors
plays no role. This result holds also in the manufacturers
sample when allowance is made for the main product
market, where firms selling on more competitive mar-
kets (national and international) are more likely to in-
troduce new products. A higher number of competitors
(columns 4 and 9) and using imported inputs correlate
positively with the probability that manufacturers en-
gage in both innovative activities.
Additional checks Table 7 collects results obtained on
the manufacturers sample and control for capacity
utilisation, capital intensity and training provided to
full-time employees in 2007, respectively. Capacity
utilisation appears positively associated with the likeli-
hood of upgrading existing products while capital inten-
sity (the net book value of machinery, vehicles and
equipment relative to the number of permanent full-
time employees) is positively correlated with the likeli-
hood of introducing new products. There is evidence of
a significant positive association between human capital
(as measured by formal training provided to firms’
permanent full-time employees) and firm innovation.
The marginal effects calculated at the mean are large:
13.5% for introducing new products and 9.4% for
upgrading existing ones.
5.2 Subsidy effects for financially constrained firms
Throughout the analysis, it appears that financially
stronger firms and firms receiving subsidies are more
likely to innovate. This section considers whether the
relationship between subsidies and firm innovation
varies with financial constraints. The marginal effects
in Table 8 are obtained from models in which Subsidies
and the respective financial strength variable are
interacted with FC and (1-FC). The interactions with
FC (=1 if access to finance is the firm’s biggest obstacle)
refer to the link between subsidies (respectively, finan-
cial strength) and the innovation of financially
constrained firms, while the interactions with (1-FC)
refer to financially unconstrained firms. All specifica-
tions control for industry and country effects and cluster
standard errors at country level. Across columns, bothTa
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subsidies and firm financial strength are more strongly
related with the probability of introducing new products
for financially constrained firms. The results for Up-
grade are weaker. This could be due to the fact that
financial constraints are likely to be stronger for the
introduction of new products, associated with more
severe asymmetric information, than for upgrading
existing products.
Table 9 collects additional results when the variables
reflecting firm financial strength at the time of the inter-
view (credit line use, overdraft facility and cash holding)
are interacted with receipt (or not) of public funding in
the last 3 years, i.e. with Subsidy and No Subsidy.18 This
approach, similar to Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005),
allows the financial variable to impact firm innovation
according to receipt (or not) of subsidies.19 Panel A
reports the marginal effects obtained on the whole sam-
ple for both NewProducts and Upgrade. Looking across
columns, the financial strength variable attracts larger
marginal effects when interacted with Subsidy for both
innovation indicators. This finding implies that subsi-
dies enhance firms’ financial strength which then boosts
their innovative activities.
An advantage of the dataset is that it allows cross-
country comparisons. Panel B reports results for sepa-
rate samples according to country EU membership.20
All interaction terms attract large and generally signifi-
cant marginal effects in the new products/services spec-
ification for both country groups. The marginal effects
for the interactions with Subsidy are larger than those for
the interactions with No Subsidy and t test results con-
firm that, in all cases, the difference is statistically sig-
nificant. This means that subsidies ameliorate financial
constraints affecting firm innovation in all countries, but
the marginal effects are largest for the non-EU group. In
what regards the upgrading of existing products, the
interaction terms appear significant only for firms in
non-EU countries. Once again, the marginal effects are
significantly larger for the interactions with Subsidy
relative to those with No Subsidy. These results are in
line with the idea that firm innovation in non-EU coun-
tries suffers from more binding financial constraints
than that in EU countries. Subsidy receipt is thus partic-
ularly important for the innovation of firms in countries
with less developed financial markets.
5.3 Self-reported financial constraints
This section uses the self-reported measure of financial
constraints FC (coded 1 if firms report access to finance
as the major obstacle to their business operations, 0
otherwise) instead of balance sheet data regarding use
of (external or internal) funding. Gorodnichenko and
Schnitzer (2013) construct two similar financial con-
straints measures using earlier rounds of BEEPS21 and
suggest using an instrumental variable approach to ad-
dress the possibility that innovating firms are more
likely to face financial constraints than firms that do
not innovate. Ayyagari et al. (2011) use the instrumental
variable probit as robustness check.
The IV probit estimator cannot handle discrete or
limited endogenous regressors, which is the case of the
endogenous variable FC. To deal with the binary nature
of the self-reported financial constraints measure, the
baseline model including industry and country fixed
effects is estimated with the special regressor estimator
proposed by Lewbel (2000).22 For purposes of compar-
ison, however, the IV probit estimates are reported in
Appendix Table 14. The instrument used is Overdue,
defined 1/0 if firms report payments overdue by more
than 90 days with utilities or taxes.23 The first-stage
estimates show that overdue payments are highly sig-
nificant in predicting firm financial constraints. Overdue
will be the instrument used in all specifications below.
The second-stage results confirm that employing self-
18 The variable BankLoans is not interacted with the indicators of
subsidy receipt as the question regarding the use of bank loans to
purchase fixed assets refers to year 2007, which means it may precede
subsidy receipt.
19 Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) interact government funding in a
given area with four alternative measures of industry dependence on
external finance to show that government funding disproportionately
affected the R&D expenditure of Finnish SME firms operating in
industries dependent on external finance.
20 For reasons discussed earlier in note 16, the EU group includes
member countries as of 2004. Robustness checks including Bulgaria,
Romania and Croatia in the EU group leave results unaltered.
21 Using earlier rounds of BEEPS, Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer
(2013) construct two proxies for self-reported financial constraints:
Difficulty of Access to External Finance and Cost of External Finance,
each taking four values (0/3) corresponding to whether access to
finance and, respectively, cost of external finance are considered ‘no
obstacle’, ‘minor’, ‘moderate’ or ‘major obstacle’ for the operation and
growth of the business.
22 The estimation uses the sspecialreg command developed in Stata by
Baum (2012).
23 Aghion et al. (2012) propose a payment incident variable (if the firm
fails to pay its trade creditors) as an indicator of firm credit constraints.
Similar to this, the instrument used by Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer
(2013) is overdue payments to suppliers, which unfortunately is not
available in BEEPS 2009.
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reported measures of financial constraints does not alter
the innovation-subsidy relation.
The special regressor estimator has a further advantage
relative to the maximum likelihood approach, as it allows
for heteroskedasticity of unknown form in the model’s
error process. The method relies on a particular ‘special
regressor’ that is exogenous and appears additively in the
model. The special regressor must be continuously dis-
tributed, with a large support so that it can take on a wide
range of values and, ideally, it should have thick tails.
Firm age (demeaned) is used as the special regressor
since it is exogenously determined, continuously
distributed and as shown previously (Table 3, panel C),
likely to be correlated with firm innovativeness.24 While
this method requires strong restrictions on one variable,
the special regressor age, it provides useful robustness
checks against alternative estimators.
As in a probit model, the quantities of interest are
marginal effects. Table 10 reports marginal effects and
bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) calculat-
ed for the two dependent variables NewProduct and
24 Dong and Lewbel (2015) use age as the special regressor in their
analysis of individual decision to migrate from one US state to another.
Table 7 Additional results
NewProduct Upgrade
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EMP 0.029 0.038 0.013 0.077*** 0.092*** 0.068***
(0.019) (0.024) (0.015) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023)
EMP2 −0.003 −0.005 −0.003 −0.009*** −0.010*** −0.008***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Exporter 0.074*** 0.071** 0.076*** 0.032 0.035 0.033
(0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022)
Foreign −0.005 0.019 −0.003 0.002 0.022 −0.005
(0.033) (0.034) (0.030) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021)
R&D 0.319*** 0.321*** 0.308*** 0.194*** 0.193*** 0.181***
(0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Subsidy 0.072*** 0.077*** 0.070*** 0.034** 0.024 0.028**
(0.018) (0.020) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
CreditLine 0.088*** 0.092*** 0.071*** 0.083*** 0.070*** 0.071***
(0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
Age 0.007 0.014 0.009 −0.010 −0.005 −0.011
(0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010)
Group 0.021 −0.002 0.015 0.013 −0.011 0.005
(0.022) (0.034) (0.023) (0.026) (0.034) (0.028)
CU -0.047 0.087***
(0.043) (0.020)
CapIntens 0.001*** −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Training 0.127*** 0.096***
(0.016) (0.012)
Observations 4247 3248 4513 4238 3245 4502
Pseudo Rsq 0.140 0.142 0.150 0.141 0.138 0.144
Log likelihood −2467 −1889 −2601 −1977 −1527 −2117
The table reports marginal effects calculated at the means and robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. All
specifications include industry and country fixed effects
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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Upgrade. Several sensitivity tests of the special regres-
sor model are conducted. Firstly, the estimator allows
for two methods of estimation of the density: the stan-
dard kernel density (odd columns) and the sorted data
density of Lewbel and Schennach (2007) in even col-
umns. Secondly, outliers are removed to improve the
mean squared error of the estimator by trading off bias
for variance (Dong and Lewbel 2015) at different
Table 8 Probit marginal effects—interaction with financial constraints
NewProduct Upgrade
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EMP 0.035** 0.040** −0.015 0.044*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.018 0.072***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
EMP2 −0.003 −0.003 0.003 −0.003 −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.002 −0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exporter 0.086*** 0.093*** 0.071*** 0.088*** 0.038*** 0.037** 0.026** 0.040***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014)
Foreign 0.088*** 0.083*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.046*** 0.052*** 0.021 0.042**
(0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
R&D 0.323*** 0.326*** 0.261*** 0.324*** 0.206*** 0.205*** 0.157*** 0.206***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
Age −0.009 −0.005 −0.004 −0.013 −0.002 −0.002 0.001 −0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Subsidy*FC 0.092** 0.102** 0.074* 0.108*** 0.051 0.063 0.046* 0.069
(0.042) (0.041) (0.038) (0.040) (0.045) (0.048) (0.024) (0.045)
Subsidy*(1-FC) 0.055*** 0.067*** 0.041* 0.057*** 0.047** 0.060*** 0.031 0.044*
(0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024)
CreditLine*FC 0.087*** 0.044**
(0.016) (0.017)
CreditLine*(1-FC) 0.065*** 0.023*
(0.014) (0.012)
Overdraft*FC 0.078*** 0.052***
(0.020) (0.017)
Overdraft*(1-FC) 0.046*** 0.033**
(0.014) (0.014)
BankLoan*FC 0.049* 0.019
(0.028) (0.025)
BankLoan*(1-FC) 0.014 0.008
(0.013) (0.010)
CashHolding*FC 0.084*** 0.042**
(0.026) (0.018)
CashHolding *(1-FC) 0.068*** 0.042**
(0.023) (0.019)
Observations 10,017 9404 5844 9832 9955 9344 5823 9767
Pseudo Rsq 0.130 0.133 0.118 0.128 0.123 0.126 0.125 0.123
Log likelihood −5993 −5607 −3340 −5892 −4985 −4695 −2412 −4891
The table reports marginal effects calculated at the mean and robust standard errors clustered at country level. Subsidy and the financial
variables are interacted with FC and 1-FC. All specifications include industry and country fixed effects
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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Table 9 Probit marginal effects—interaction with subsidies
NewProduct Upgrade
Panel A. Whole sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z`EMP 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.075***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
EMP2 −0.003* −0.004** −0.004** −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exporter 0.083*** 0.093*** 0.086*** 0.037** 0.038*** 0.040***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Foreign 0.078*** 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.041**
(0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
R&D 0.323*** 0.327*** 0.324*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 0.213***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age −0.004 −0.001 −0.008 0.001 0.001 −0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
CreditLine* No
Subsidy
0.073*** 0.031***
(0.014) (0.011)
CreditLine*
Subsidy
0.139*** 0.074***
(0.019) (0.027)
Overdraft* No
Subsidy
0.047*** 0.034***
(0.013) (0.012)
Overdraft*
Subsidy
0.118*** 0.121***
(0.023) (0.027)
CashHolding* No
Subsidy
0.067*** 0.038**
(0.025) (0.018)
CashHolding*
Subsidy
0.140*** 0.087***
(0.020) (0.021)
Observations 11,092 10,404 10,874 11,024 10,338 10,805
Pseudo Rsq 0.128 0.130 0.127 0.125 0.130 0.126
Log likelihood −6667 −6240 −6547 −5564 −5236 −5454
Panel B. Separate samples according to country EU membership
NewProduct Upgrade
Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
EMP 0.055*** −0.006 0.063*** −0.007 0.063*** 0.003 0.076*** 0.023 0.076*** 0.017 0.078*** 0.034*
(0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.022) (0.014) (0.018)
EMP2 −0.005** 0.002 −0.006*** 0.002 −0.005** 0.002 −0.009*** 0.002 −0.009*** 0.002 −0.009*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exporter 0.079*** 0.097*** 0.091*** 0.100*** 0.087*** 0.078*** 0.040** 0.031** 0.043** 0.028** 0.044** 0.025*
(0.017) (0.029) (0.017) (0.027) (0.017) (0.026) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014)
Foreign 0.058* 0.124*** 0.045 0.128*** 0.051* 0.116*** 0.030 0.050** 0.029 0.058*** 0.028 0.052***
(0.030) (0.016) (0.032) (0.023) (0.029) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020)
R&D 0.337*** 0.266*** 0.344*** 0.257*** 0.338*** 0.257*** 0.220*** 0.176*** 0.222*** 0.172*** 0.223*** 0.162***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025) (0.011) (0.034) (0.012) (0.033) (0.011) (0.034)
Age −0.001 −0.022 0.003 −0.022 −0.003 −0.034* −0.001 0.017 −0.000 0.018 −0.002 0.021
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percentile values. Columns 1–4 winsorise the 2.5% of
the data, while in columns 5–8 tail values are set equal to
the fifth percentile of the data.
Looking across columns, irrespective of the method of
estimation of the density and the percentile used to
winsorise the data, the estimates suggest that financially
constrained firms are less likely to innovate. Importantly, as
in the simple probit estimations, Subsidies are still posi-
tively and significantly associated with firm innovation.
Panel B of Table 8 reports marginal effects obtained
with the special regressor on separate samples according
to EU country membership, for both NewProducts and
Upgrade. All specifications control for industry and
country effects and the data is winsorised at the 2.5%
tails. Winsorisation at 5% produces qualitatively similar
results. Both the kernel (columns 1, 2, 5, 6) and the
sorted data (columns 3, 4, 7, 8) density estimators are
used to check the robustness of results. These estimates
suggest that the positive relation between subsidies and
firm innovation seem to be mainly driven by firms in
non-EU countries. The implicit assumption here, con-
sistent with the summary statistics, is that firms in non-
EU member countries are more likely to be financially
constrained than their counterparts in an EU country.
5.4 Matching techniques
Given the secondary survey data used in this study, it is
difficult to establish a causal relationship between re-
ceipt of subsidies and firm innovation. This would entail
showing the counterfactual that had the firm not re-
ceived any subsidies, it would not have been able to
innovate. Subsidised firms may have put more effort
into innovative activities than non-subsidised firms even
in the absence of the subsidies. As common in the
literature on the evaluation of R&D subsidies, this sec-
tion uses a propensity score matching technique to com-
pare the actual outcome of subsidised firms with their
potential outcome in case of not receiving a subsidy.
Matching techniques aim to construct a sample counter-
part for the treated (i.e. subsidised) firms’ outcomes had
they not been treated by using an average of the out-
comes of similar firms that were not treated. Similarity
between firms is based on estimated treatment
Table 9 (continued)
(0.011) (0.021) (0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.020)
CreditLine* No
Subsidy
0.082*** 0.036* 0.045*** −0.014
(0.017) (0.019) (0.011) (0.026)
CreditLine*
Subsidy
0.164*** 0.096*** 0.100*** −0.001
(0.019) (0.033) (0.027) (0.051)
Overdraft*No
Subsidy
0.055*** 0.014 0.047*** −0.005
(0.014) (0.027) (0.010) (0.039)
Overdraft*
Subsidy
0.125*** 0.110*** 0.150*** 0.046
(0.030) (0.038) (0.016) (0.060)
CashHolding*No
Subsidy
0.064** 0.081 0.038* 0.083
(0.026) (0.087) (0.020) (0.081)
CashHolding *
Subsidy
0.139*** 0.152* 0.101*** 0.079
(0.024) (0.078) (0.024) (0.054)
Observations 8889 2203 8226 2178 8883 1991 8833 2191 8172 2166 8825 1980
Pseudo Rsq 0.129 0.125 0.132 0.124 0.126 0.126 0.121 0.155 0.126 0.156 0.120 0.164
Log likelihood −5352 −1296 −4937 −1282 −5370 −1161 −4557 −981.6 −4241 −970.7 −4569 −862.5
Panel A: The table reports marginal effects calculated at the mean and robust standard errors clustered at country level. The financial
variables CreditLine and Overdraft are interacted with Subsidy and No Subsidy. All specifications include industry and country fixed effects
Panel B: The table reports marginal effects calculated at the mean and robust standard errors clustered at country level. The financial
variables CreditLine and Overdraft are interacted with Subsidy and No Subsidy. The sample is split according to country EU membership.
All specifications include industry and country fixed effects
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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probabilities, known as propensity scores. A treated firm
is matched to the nearest non-treated firm in the control
group in terms of propensity scores for the given set of
observable characteristics. Under the matching assump-
tion, the only remaining difference between the two
groups is the actual treatment effect.
Table 11 reports the matching results.25 The columns
labelled average treatment effect on the treated (ATET)
give the estimated impact of receiving a subsidy on the
likelihood of undertaking innovative activities
(Newprod and Upgrade) for subsidised firms. As ex-
pected, subsidies are more strongly related with the
likelihood of introducing new products or services than
with the probability of upgrading existing ones, which
depends mostly on internal funding.
The rows report the model (variables) used to perform
thematching. For instance, in panel Amodel 1, subsidised
firms are matched with non-subsidised firms similar in
terms of size, export participation, foreign capital, R&D
engagement, financial strength (CreditLine), industry and
country. The numbers reported imply that subsidies in-
crease the likelihood of subsidised firms to introduce new
products/services (column 1) and to upgrade existing ones
(column 4) by 5.9 and 3.3%, respectively. The subsequent
models add variables to the matching procedure: belong-
ing to a group (model 2) and age (model 3). The next two
models consider market characteristics when matching
subsidised and non-subsidised firms: factors exerting pres-
sure on firms to innovate (model 4) and the main product
market (model 5). The average treatment effects on the
subsidised (relative to the non-subsidised) firms are eco-
nomically and statistically significant. The smallest coef-
ficients, though significant, are obtained when similarity
between treated and untreated firms conditions on the
establishment being part of a larger firm for NewProducts
and age of the firm for Upgrade, respectively.
Panel B reports average treatment effects on the
subsidised firms when the matching procedure is model
3 replacing credit line with alternative financial vari-
ables. These results suggest that subsidies generally
have a positive significant impact on the innovative
activities of subsidised firms irrespective of the variable
used to measure firm financial strength.
Finally, panel C of Table 11 presents average treat-
ment effects obtained from separate samples of firms.
Matching is performed according to firms’ size (includ-
ing non-linear term), export participation, foreign capi-
tal, R&D input, financial strength, industry and country. In
the first two lines, firms are separated according to self-
reported financial constraints, while the other sub-samples
reflect whether (or not) firms operate in an EU member
state. Firm financial strength is captured, alternatively, by
the existence of a credit line (rows 3–4), of an overdraft
facility (rows 5–6), the use of bank loans to purchase fixed
assets (rows 7–8) and cash holdings (rows 9–10). Overall,
the estimates in panel C suggest that public subsidies have
a larger impact on the innovative activities of financially
constrained firms (either self-reported or operating in a
non-EU country). Consistent with the results in panels A
and B for the whole sample, the average treatment effects
are generally larger for the introduction of new products/
services relative to the upgrade of existing ones.
Overall, the results obtained with the four estimation
approaches suggest a positive relationship between pub-
lic subsidies and firm innovation as measured by the
introduction of new products and services and the up-
grade of existing ones. The relationship appears to be
stronger in the presence of financial constraints. As a
final robustness check, the whole analysis is done when
the innovative indicators are replaced with Outsource
and Discont (results not reported). While there seem to
be positive subsidy effects in the case of outsourcing
activities, there is weak evidence supporting a link be-
tween public subsidies and firms discontinuing an
existing product or service.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the relationship between public
subsidies and firm innovation in the context of emerging
economies. Innovation activities are defined broadly to
include the introduction of new products or services and
the upgrade of existing ones, which are of particular rele-
vance for these countries. The detailed firm level data
collected by the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS) allows construction of alter-
native indicators of firm financial strength (access to exter-
nal funding, internal finance and self-reported measures of
financial constraints) and measures of market competition
for roughly 12,000 firms across 30 countries in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia. A range of econometric
25 Matching is performed using the teffects psmatch command in Stata.
The advantage of this command is that it takes into account the fact that
propensity scores are estimated rather than known when calculating
standard errors. See Abadie and Imbens (2016) for a formal discussion
on the application of estimated propensity scores.
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techniques, including a standard probit model, instrumental
variables (probit and special regressor) and treatment ef-
fects, provides robustness of results to the choice of esti-
mator. Although there may be considerable variation in the
details of how subsidy programs are implemented and
other institutional, political and cultural factors may influ-
ence the effects of subsidies on innovation, our analysis
identifies some robust patterns across countries.
The paper finds a positive correlation between receipt
of subsidies and the innovative activities of firms in emerg-
ing economies. The positive link appears to be stronger for
firms more likely to be financially constrained. Notably,
our results are obtained using data covering the period
2007–2009, when many of the countries in our sample
were affected by the financial crisis.While firm innovative
activities are always likely to be subject to more stringent
financing constraints than other firm activities, this is likely
to be exacerbated during periods of crisis.26 As innovative
firms introducing new products, services, processes or
business models are more likely to create new markets,
achieve rapid growth and help the economy recover (Lee
et al. 2015), our findings highlight the importance of
public support to firms in these economies.
Our results have clear policy value. The positive link
between finance and innovation points towards the impor-
tance of financial market development. Policy measures
fostering financial market development, in conjunction
with the national institutional framework, could help stim-
ulate firm innovation in emerging economies. As financial
constraints for innovation prevail even in developed econ-
omies, direct public provision via subsidies maintains an
important role especially for financially constrained inno-
vative firms. Innovation policies in emerging economies
could, however, be gradually designed taking into account
the potential additional benefits of using both direct and
indirect instruments (loan programmes, guarantees, R&D
tax incentives). Finally, our results have indirect implica-
tions for industrial policy as well as captured by the
positive impact of product market competition and partic-
ipation in export markets on increased firm innovation.
The cross-sectional nature of the data allows us only
to identify a positive static relation between subsidies
and firm innovation. Ideally, availability of panel data
would help identify whether subsidy policies may have
lagged effects on innovation as well. As suggested by
Arque-Castells and Mohnen (2015), tailored subsidy
policies could both trigger new firms engage in R&D
and support existing innovators. Ensuring innovation
continuation and persistence over time would make
public intervention via subsidies of utmost importance
for emerging economies, given the positive link be-
tween innovation and long-term economic growth.
Clearly, the net effect of lagging behind or catching up
with industrialised economies would depend on several
other policy instruments in developed and developing
countries, which are beyond the scope of this paper.
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Data Appendix
Variable definitions
Innovative activities
NewProduct = 1 if the firm has introduced new
products or services in the last 3 years (i.e. over
the period 2007–2009), 0 otherwise.
Upgrade = 1 if the firm has upgraded an existing
product line or service in the last 3 years, 0
otherwise
Outsource = 1 if, in the last 3 years, the firm has
contracted with other companies (outsourced) activi-
ties previously performed in-house, 0 otherwise
Discont = 1 if the firm has discontinued at least one
product line or service in the last three years, 0
otherwise
R&D = 1 if, in fiscal year 2007, the firm spent a
positive amount on research and development ac-
tivities, either in-house or contracted with other
companies (outsourced), 0 otherwise.
R&D(ln) = the continuousmeasure of R&D used in
robustness tests is measured as the logarithm of 1 +
the amount spent of research and development in
2007
26 Financial constraints likely interact with a number of internal and
external factors in setting innovative firms’ ability to react to economic
recessions. For instance, in a recent study of Italian small- andmedium-
sized family firms over the period 2002–2011, Cucculelli and Bettinelli
(2016) identify the crucial role played by firms’ organisational learning
and adaptive capacity, combined with internal corporate governance
and managerial characteristics such as CEO’s origin, tenure and turn-
over, in firms’ successful responses to economic recession.
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Subsidy = 1 if the firm has received any subsidies
from the national, regional or local governments or
European Union sources over the last 3 years, 0
otherwise
Financial strength
CreditLine = 1 if the firm has a credit line or loan
from a financial institution, 0 otherwise
Overdraft = 1 if the firm has an overdraft facility, 0
otherwise
BankLoan = 1 if the firm borrowed from private or
state-owned banks to purchase fixed assets in 2007,
0 otherwise. Firms have to estimate the proportion
of their total purchases of fixed assets that was
financed from each of the following sources: (a)
internal funds or retained earnings, (b) owners’
contribution or issued new equity shares, (c)
borrowed from private banks, (d) borrowed from
state-owned banks, (e) purchases on credit from
suppliers and advances from customers, (f) other
(moneylenders, friends, relatives, non-banking fi-
nancial institutions, etc.). These proportions add up
to 100%. Firms which did not purchase any fixed
assets were not asked this question.
CashHolding = 1 if the firm has a checking or
savings account at the time of the interview, 0
otherwise. The translation of the question in Slovak
Republic referred to savings account only. BEEPS
replaced all values with missing for this country as
the data is not comparable to other countries.
Overdue = 1 if firms have overdue payments by more
than 90 days with either utilities or taxes, 0 otherwise.
Self-reported financial constraints
FC = 1 if firms choose access to finance as their current
biggest obstacle, 0 otherwise. Firms have to choose
which of the following elements of the business envi-
ronment, if any, represents their biggest obstacle: 1 =
access to finance; 2 = access to land; 3 = business
licencing and permits; 4 = Corruption; 5 = Courts; 6 =
Crime, theft and disorder; 7 = Customs and trade regu-
lations; 8 = Electricity; 9 = Inadequately educated work-
force; 10 = Labour regulations; 11 = Political instability;
12 = Practices of competitors in the informal sector; 13
= Tax administration; 14 = Tax rates; 15 = Transport.
Firm characteristics
Emp = number of permanent full-time employees at
the end of last fiscal year (logarithm)
Small = 1/0 if the respondent had less than 50 full-
time employees at the end of previous fiscal year
SME = 1/0 if the respondent is a small and medium
enterprise, i.e. it had less than 250 full-time em-
ployees at the end of previous fiscal year
Foreign = 1/0 if the primary owner (majority capital)
is a foreign individual, company or organisation
Exporter = 1/0 if the firm had any export sales
(directly or indirectly) in 2007
Age = number of years since the firm was
established
CU = capacity utilisation, output produced as a
proportion of the maximum output possible if using
all facilities available in 2007
CapIntens = capital intensity is the net book value
(after depreciation) of machinery, vehicles and
equipment relative to the number of permanent
full-time employees in 2007
Training = 1 if the firm had any formal training
programs for its permanent, full-time employees in
2007, 0 otherwise
Market characteristics
City = ordered variable indicating size of locality
where firm operates; 1 = capital city; 2 = population
over 1 million; 3 = over 250,000 to 1 million;
4 = 50,000 to 250,000; 5 = less than 50,000 population
Importinp = proportion of material inputs or sup-
plies of foreign origin relative to total inputs pur-
chased in 2007
Compet = ordered variable indicating the number
of competitors in the domestic market with values 1
(no competitors), 2 (1 competitor), 3 (2–5 compet-
itors) and 4 (more than 5 competitors).
Market = 1 if main product is mostly sold on the
local market, 2 if it is mainly sold on the national or
3 if mainly sold on the international market
Pressure to innovate measures
Are constructed based on answers to the question BHow
important are each of the following factors in affecting
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decisions to develop new products or services and
markets?^. Spontaneous answers ‘I do not know’ are
discarded.
Pres_domcomp = 1 if answer ‘very important’ or
‘fairly important’ and 0 if answer Bnot at all impor-
tant’, ‘slightly important’. The question refers to
domestic competitors.
Pres_fcomp = 1 if answer ‘very important’ or ‘fairly
important’ and 0 if answer Bnot at all important’,
‘slightly important’. The question refers to foreign
competitors.
Pres_customer = 1 if answer ‘very important’ or
‘fairly important’ and 0 if answer Bnot at all impor-
tant’, ‘slightly important’. The question refers to
customers.
Country groups
EU = 1/0 for countries that were members of EU in
2004. EU countries are Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Repub-
lic and Slovenia.
Non-EU = 1/0 for countries that were not EU
members in 2004. The non-EU countries include
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Moldova, Mongo-
lia, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Tajiki-
stan, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
Table 12 The table presents the number (and proportion) of firms
by country and industry
Freq. Percent Cum.
Panel A. Country composition
Albania 175 1.46 1.46
Armenia 374 3.12 4.58
Azerbaijan 380 3.17 7.75
Belarus 273 2.28 10.03
Bosnia and Herzegovina 361 3.01 13.04
Bulgaria 288 2.40 15.44
Croatia 159 1.33 16.77
Czech Republic 250 2.08 18.85
Estonia 273 2.28 21.13
FYR Macedonia 366 3.05 24.18
Table 12 (continued)
Freq. Percent Cum.
Georgia 373 3.11 27.29
Hungary 291 2.43 29.72
Kazakhstan 544 4.53 34.25
Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 270 2.25 36.5
Kyrgyz Republic 235 1.96 38.46
Latvia 271 2.26 40.72
Lithuania 276 2.30 43.02
Moldova 363 3.03 46.05
Mongolia 362 3.02 49.07
Montenegro 116 0.97 50.04
Poland 533 4.44 54.48
Romania 541 4.51 58.99
Russia 1256 10.47 69.46
Serbia 388 3.23 72.69
Slovak Republic 275 2.29 74.98
Slovenia 276 2.30 77.28
Tajikistan 360 3.00 80.28
Turkey 1152 9.60 89.88
Ukraine 851 7.09 96.97
Uzbekistan 366 3.03 100.00
Total 11,998 100.00
Panel B. Industry structure
Food and tobacco 1205 10.20 10.20
Textiles, clothing, leather 1070 9.06 19.26
Wood, paper, printing 503 4.26 23.52
Coke, chemicals, rubber, plastic 571 4.83 28.35
Machinery 599 5.07 33.43
Electronics and instruments 154 1.30 34.73
Metals 632 5.35 40.08
Other manufacturing 587 4.97 45.05
Construction 1049 8.88 53.93
Retail 3123 26.44 80.37
Wholesale 1031 8.73 89.10
Services 1287 10.90 100.00
Total 11,811 100.00
Firms are classified into industries based on the actual establish-
ment’s (four digit) industry classification
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Table 13 Continuous measure of R&D expenditure
NewProduct Upgrade
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EMP 0.054*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.083***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
EMP2 −0.005** −0.004** −0.004** −0.005** −0.010*** −0.009*** −0.009*** −0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exporter 0.090*** 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.047*** 0.042** 0.046*** 0.046***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Foreign 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.072*** 0.066*** 0.042** 0.044** 0.046** 0.043**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
R&D (ln) 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Subsidy 0.080*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.064*** 0.060** 0.060** 0.060**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
CreditLine 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Age −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Group 0.032 0.016
(0.024) (0.023)
Observations 9580 9520 9367 9367 9514 9456 9304 9304
Pseudo Rsq 0.101 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.107 0.107
Log likelihood −5969 −5902 −5803 −5802 −5175 −5128 −5038 −5038
The table reports marginal effects calculated at the mean. All specifications include industry and country fixed effects. R&D is measured as
the logarithm of 1 + the amount spent of research and development in 2007. Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
Table 14 IV probit estimates
NewProduct Upgrade
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Non-EU EU All Non-EU EU
EMP 0.065 0.069 −0.014 0.079 0.047 0.122**
(0.040) (0.062) (0.063) (0.051) (0.058) (0.052)
EMP2 −0.003 −0.004 0.005 −0.007 −0.005 0.001
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Exporter 0.191*** 0.149** 0.309*** 0.059 0.031 0.209***
(0.055) (0.070) (0.085) (0.047) (0.057) (0.046)
Foreign 0.126 0.073 0.378** −0.045 −0.056 0.029
(0.087) (0.087) (0.178) (0.061) (0.063) (0.195)
R&D 0.787*** 0.761*** 0.756*** 0.438*** 0.405*** 0.550**
(0.138) (0.196) (0.117) (0.111) (0.121) (0.251)
Subsidy 0.173*** 0.220*** 0.132 0.150** 0.196*** 0.036
(0.053) (0.068) (0.093) (0.058) (0.068) (0.093)
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